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Abstract:  In this paper we examine historical trends in the Silk Road where we discuss 
historical trade risks, Chinese dynasties and trade.   We  examine trade risks along the land and 
sea routes through Central Asia and Middle East. We discuss Chinese balance of payments  
during different dynasties and  the changes in the  land and the sea routes. We examine how the 
trade patterns and routes shifted with the discovery of the New World and when the Dutch and 
the British formed pooled risk trade associations.   
 
 
 
Introduction  
China has gone through many changes in the 20
th
 century and has emerged as one of the 
largest trading countries in the world in its last two decades.  In a way, China has reestablished 
itself as a world trade power as she was during the historical Silk Road trade, where trade 
corridors through land and sea across central Asia and the Middle East developed despite 
numerous risks and hazards and where trade flourished for more than a millennium.  Modern day 
Chinese trade has, presently, developed again after doors were opened to China by US and 
European countries in the 1970s and continues to grow. One can see the importance of trade in 
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Chinese economics over this time period (see Table 1).  Between 1979 to 2009, in thirty years, 
Chinese GDP in constant 2005 dollars has grown from about 201 billion  to about 3.5 trillion, 
Chinese exports have grown from almost 5 % of their share in GDP to about 29 %, imports  from 
about 4 % to 24 percent.  Trade surpluses have led to a large growth in China’s reserves, which 
has allowed Chinese capital to move out for investments, mergers and acquisitions and to 
become an important FDI source in the world’s financial stage.   
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Table 1: Chinese Imports/Exports to the World 1979-2009 (In Billions of USD) 
Year 
Exports in 
Constant 2005 
USD 
Imports in 
Constant 2005 
USD 
GDP in 
Constant 2005 
USD 
Exports as % of 
GDP  
Imports as % of 
GDP  
1979 8.19 16.67 200.65 4.98% 4.08% 
1980 8.11 20.86 216.31 4.93% 3.75% 
1981 8.77 23.43 227.55 5.41% 3.85% 
1982 7.9 18.9 248.26 5.27% 3.18% 
1983 9.07 20.71 275.32 4.81% 3.29% 
1984 13.58 26.75 317.17 5.46% 4.28% 
1985 25.72 40.75 359.99 6.15% 7.14% 
1986 26.21 37.17 391.67 6.09% 6.69% 
1987 26.31 38.88 437.1 6.59% 6.02% 
1988 31.53 49.97 486.49 6.18% 6.48% 
1989 31.76 52.75 506.44 5.82% 6.27% 
1990 39.27 32.15 525.68 7.47% 6.12% 
1991 48.35 41.01 574.05 8.42% 7.14% 
1992 56.31 56.74 655.56 8.59% 8.66% 
1993 66.4 79.14 747.34 8.89% 10.59% 
1994 127.9 130.26 845.24 15.13% 15.41% 
1995 134.94 142.62 937.37 14.40% 15.21% 
1996 151.35 162.43 1031.11 14.68% 15.75% 
1997 185.51 179.96 1127 16.46% 15.97% 
1998 198.54 196.94 1214.91 16.34% 16.21% 
1999 226.07 228.7 1307.24 17.29% 17.50% 
2000 298.51 285.51 1417.05 21.07% 20.15% 
2001 328.52 321.84 1534.66 21.41% 20.97% 
2002 420.69 371.97 1674.32 25.13% 22.22% 
2003 536.92 488.1 1841.75 29.15% 26.50% 
2004 683.63 634.09 2027.77 33.71% 31.27% 
2005 836.89 712.09 2256.9 37.08% 31.55% 
2006 1008.85 804.05 2543.53 39.66% 31.61% 
2007 1153.44 874.03 2904.71 39.71% 30.09% 
2008 1141.6 828.14 3183.56 35.86% 26.01% 
2009 1006.76 848.19 3476.45 28.96% 24.40% 
      *Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators, 5/8/2014                              
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This article examines historical trade relations and patterns of trade with the Middle 
Eastern and Central Asian and European countries China traded with between the 7
th
 and the 17
th
 
centuries.  We examine trade risks, trade trends and the political climate of Chinese-Middle East 
and European trade.   
 
Silk Road Trade in History 
 
 
Figure 1: Routes on the Silk Road (7-17
th
 centuries) 
 
 
 
 
 
http://traumwerk.stanford.edu/philolog/2011/08/byzantine_silk_smuggling_and_e.html 
 
 
 The historical Silk Road was unparalleled in the diversity of territories, rulers, regimes, 
languages, and religions through which it moved its merchandise. Sea routes developed as land 
routes became more treacherous, costly, and unreliable, and as navigation tools helped reduce 
navigation risks. Surviving trader travel records show that trade triumphed over many religious,   
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Land routes and trade activity were fragmented, where goods from the East could come to rest in 
a market of Central Asia, Persia, Syria or Eastern Anatolia, only to be picked once again and 
carried to the Roman/Seljuk/Ottoman Empire  or large European cities. In the face of these 
challenges, the way that traders and rulers managed risk determined whether they flourished or 
perished.  Risks of robbery, piracy varies greatly and stemmed from diverse resources.  
Unpredictably of risks and safety affected the choice of routes over time.  Steensgard (1974, p. 
61-62) mentions three areas, the Syrian desert, mountains between Ottoman and Persian Empires 
and between Persian and Indian Empires as being extremely unsafe passages.  
 Ottoman, Safavid (Persian), and Mogul (Indian) administrations and rulers did not 
necessarily have control over all their vast regions. Local princes, tribal leaders, and beys could 
act both as tax gatherers, with a vested interest in making sure that trade was sustainable, and as 
robbers, with short time horizons. Steensgaard (1974) states that, of the two, “from the 
merchant’s point of view the tax-gatherer had one advantage….: he was to a larger degree 
predictable.… Within the Islamic area there was apparently a tendency to maintain customs rates 
once they were agreed upon” (63). To cope with the problem of bandits, on the other hand, 
caravans incorporated armed guards into their caravans. They also employed local tribesmen as 
guides  in the frontier towns before they crossed into their territories.  
 Travel reports provide economic details illuminating risks, safety, as well as costs of 
various routes from China and India. For instance, caravans paid premiums when traveling safer 
roads, such as the Isfahan-Gombroon-Surat route (the latter in Gujarat, India), which saw higher 
tax rates than the riskier Isfahan-Kandahar-Lahore route(the latter in Punjab, Pakistan). As time 
went on, taxes continued to play an important role in routes’ competitiveness, as they do in trade 
today. By the sixteenth century, reports describe intense competition among various land and sea 
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route cities. Competing with each other were the cities of Erzurum and Van (in Asia Minor), 
Gombroon (in Bandar Abbas, Iran) and Kandahar (in Afghanistan), and in general, land routes 
and sea routes. Competition between cities forced Basra (in Iraq) to lower taxes to levy tariffs of 
only 5%, while actually charging 4% (Steensgaard, 63, 67). Table 2 reports customs rates 
charged by various cities in the late medieval/early modern period, as well as the contemporary 
tariff rate charged by each nation’s modern-day equivalent taxes.  
  
Table 2:  Tariffs in the late medieval/early modern period and today 
Country (Description) Late medieval/early 
modern tariffs (date) 
21
st
-century tariffs* (date) 
Portuguese, Straits of 
Hormuz 
11% in royal customs + 1% 
naval defense + 3% for non-
Christian merchants 
European Union: 5.5% 
(2012) 
Persian duties, from Dutch 
East India Company 
13.5% (1637-38) Iran:  26.6% (2011) 
Persian duties, Gombroon 10.75% + 3.6% export tax + 
1.22% + 100 dinars per bale 
+ 650 in gifts (Total 16%) 
(1682-83) 
Iran:  26.6% (2011) 
Cairo, pepper duties in kind 10%; refused passage if the 
depots were full; Venetians 
played the embargo at the 
expense of French (p. 65) 
Egypt:  16.8% (2012) 
Erzurum duties (Ottomans) Higher for cheaper silk from 
Shirvan than more 
expensive silk from Gilan. 
The latter had more route 
choices. In Erzurum, 
bargained for 80 piastres per 
bale, regardless of value. (p. 
66) 
Turkey:  9.6% (2011) 
Source:  17
th
-century data constructed from information in Steensgaard 1974, pp. 63, 65, and 
198. Modern information from WTO World Tariffs Profile 2013. 
* simple average of applied general non-preferential duty rate, all products 
 
Table 3 reports the approximate GDP per capita of China and trading partners during the 
Silk Road and compares it with a more current GDP per capita estimate. Given the time frame, 
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the historical per capita numbers of are quite high, denoting that trade took place among the 
wealthier areas during the Silk Road. 
Table 3:  GDP/Capita, Updated Estimates (1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars) 
 Year 
 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 2008 
China - - - - 600 6,725 
Spain - 846 892 814 - 17,734 
Holland/ 
Netherlands 
- 1,454 2,662 2,105 1,874 25,112 
Portugal - - 1,164 975 923 14,583 
Italy (Center-
North) 
- 1,533 1,363 1,476 1,511 19,460 
India - - - - - 2,952 
Indonesia
1 - - - - 528 4,354 
Malaysia - - - - 603 9,880 
Sri Lanka - - - - 550 4,882 
Thailand - - - - 570 8,923 
Vietnam - - - - 527 2,926 
Japan - - 574 629 - 22,175 
North Korea - - - - 335 1,122 
South Korea - - - - 335 20,454 
Philippines - - - - 584 2,888 
Iran - - - - 588 6,013 
Turkey/ 
Byzantium/ 
Ottoman 
Empire 
~600 ~660 - ~700 ~740 8,127 
Syria - - - - 658 7,556 
Iraq ~820 - - - 588 1,598 
Turkmenistan - - - - - 3,913 
Uzbekistan - - - - - 5,237 
Kazakhstan - - - - - 10,639 
Tajikistan - - - - - 1,556 
Afghanistan - - - - - 869 
Kyrgyzstan - - - - - 2,965 
Mongolia - - - - - 1,001 
Note: Tilde  (~) stands for approximate. 
Source: Reprinted with permission from Bolt & van Zanden 2013.  For country-specific source 
data, see Appendix. 
Accessed:  January 17, 2014, at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm 
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Principal-Agent Problem and Risks in Trade 
Appointments of  local administrators within the empires were ‘purchased’ by the 
winners who paid monies to the central government, as had been the historical custom in ancient 
empires.  This created a principal-agent problem in that the appointees had a short time horizon 
to collect taxes as well as get  a return on their surcharges/bribes.  If the totals were too high, this 
would divert traders on the that particular route to alternate routes in the long run. Portugal 
appointed administrators for 3 years, Levant appointed them for even less periods of time. 
Legendary Shah Abbas of Persia solved this principal-agent problem during his reign (b1571-
d1621) by adding highway police (rahdari) to create a much safer route than those offered in 
other regions by the Ottomans or by Christian (Portuguese) governments  and furthermore 
required local administrators to pay compensation for any caravan robberies that took place in 
their territories, which also increased safe passage during his reign (Steensgaard, 67). 
 However, the fragmented nature of the routes meant that, for the majority of history, no 
single party had an incentive to attempt to make the routes safer along their entire extent. It took 
a body the size of the Mongol empire, whose vast territory gave it a clear interest in trade along 
the extent of the route, to assume responsibility for trade route security throughout Central Asia. 
For example, the Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty of China aggressively maintained shelters along routes 
and issued documentation guaranteeing travelers “protection, accommodations, transportation, 
and exemption from local taxes or duties” (Weatherford, 221). This type of large-scale 
coordination to promote the security of the routes, however, was rare throughout history. 
 For the most part, risk management depended upon traders’ foresight and ingenuity. The 
best ways to mitigate risk and to gain bargaining power, however, were not devised by countries 
historically involved in the East-West trade, such as China, India, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, or 
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Italy. Rather, the form of the organization that succeeded in long-term, large-scale trade came 
from two northern countries, the Dutch Republic and the British Empire, who both sought to 
enter the lucrative trade routes as outsiders. Instead of conducting individual initiatives, the 
Dutch and British formed risk-sharing pools by issuing stocks. Chinese merchants had pioneered 
a similar strategy, yet it was the Dutch and the British who employed it successfully on a large 
scale over the long term. This proved an effective strategy, and the bargaining power that this 
strategy afforded was so great that Shah Abbas gave the Dutch India Company capitulations on 
tariffs. (Steensgaard 1974). We now explore, in more detail, the approaches to trade and risk 
mitigation of various parties over time. 
 
 
Silk Road Trade and Chinese Dynasties 
  
Growth in Foreign Trade during the Tang Dynasty 
The Tang dynasty, which lasted from 618 to 907 CE, saw significant developments in 
foreign trade (Fairbank, 1992). During the seventh century, trade with Chinese Turkestan and 
with modern-day Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea was facilitated by Chinese conquest of these 
regions.  Encouraged by economic development, residents of China’s growing cities began to 
acquire a taste for foreign goods that had previously been enjoyed only by the courts (Schafer, 
1963). Foreign trade continued to bloom during the first half of the eighth century, described as 
“a long epoch of wealth, safety, and low prices” when “the Chinese taste for the exotic 
permeated every social class and every part of daily life” (Schafer, 1963, 8, 28).  
This increase in foreign trade was facilitated both by improvements in transportation as 
well as the official monetization of the Chinese economy that occurred in 731 (Schafer, 1963). 
According to Hansen (2012), the Tang government had trouble minting sufficient bronze coins 
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and therefore recognized bolts of silk as another form of currency, meaning that military 
subsidies in the form of silk sent to troops in China’s northwest caused trade in those regions to 
expand. Roads in general were safe and traversable. A canal system connecting the mouth of the 
Yangtze River to the capital was upgraded, and a large road was built to connect the port city of 
Canton with the heart of China. Drawn by the profits to be made, many foreigners came to live 
and trade in China during the Tang dynasty (Schafer, 1963).  
Records show that during the Tang Dynasty, four main routes through which China 
experienced the outside world were the central land route; the southern sea route; the northern 
land route; and the far southern sea route, also known as the “cinnamon route” (Adshead 2000, 
82). Each route was an institution in its own right and supported a particular (often ethnic and 
mobile) Central Asian and Middle East and African merchant community (Adshead 2000). Table 
4  illustrates this  ethnicity breakdown. 
Table 4:  Trade routes and their merchant communities under the Tang (618-908)   
 
Trade Route Merchant Community 
Central land route Syrians from northern Mesopotamia; 
Sogdians from Transoxiana 
Southern sea route Merchants from Oman, Shiraz, Isfahan, 
Basra; Persians from southwest Iran 
Northern land route Radhanite Jews 
Far southern sea route Afro-Indonesians of coastal East Africa 
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 72-83. 
 
 
 The main goods traded along these routes included spices, minerals, and textiles. Under 
the cosmopolitan and outward-looking Tang, China imported enthusiastically; on the whole, 
however, China ran a trade surplus as the West’s imports exceeded China’s (Adshead 2000). 
Furthermore, the West needed China’s innovations more than China needed the West’s. From 
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this trade, the West received technology for making silk, paper, and harnesses and stirrups, while 
China received cotton, sugar, and improved glassmaking techniques (Adshead 2000)
i
. 
 While the central land route saw increased traffic under the Tang as compared to the past 
due to Chinese conquest of Chinese Turkestan and modern-day Mongolia, Manchuria, and 
Korea, the southern sea route transported more goods overall (Adshead 2000, Schafer 1963). 
Under the Tang, the Indian Ocean was “a safe and rich ocean, thronged with ships of every 
nationality”. Despite sailors’ various origins, Persian served as “the lingua franca of the 
Southern Seas” (Schafer 1963, 12). During the Tang, the trading ships along this route were not 
of Chinese origin; Chinese sailors who made the journey did so in foreign ships, such as the 
famously large ships of Ceylon (Schafer 1963). Competition became keen between the land and 
the sea routes. 
Encouraged by economic development, residents of China’s growing cities began to 
demand more imported goods. This increase in foreign trade was facilitated both by 
improvements in transportation as well as the official monetization of the Chinese economy that 
occurred in 731. Drawn by the profits to be made, many foreigners came to live and trade in 
China during the Tang dynasty (Schafer 1963).   
Trade under the Tang was “never free from political entanglements” (Schafer, 1963, 23). 
Not only did the government heavily regulate which goods could enter and exit China while 
seeking a cut from the distribution of those in the highest demand, but it also forced much of its 
foreign trade into the framework of diplomacy (Schafer, 1963). Under the “tribute system,” as it 
is called by historians, China’s neighbors (particularly nomadic tribes) were expected to send 
gifts to the Chinese emperor as a way of recognizing China’s cultural superiority (Fairbank, 
1992). The tribute system was meant to establish that the emperor of China “held Heaven’s 
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Mandate” and that his “magnificent benevolence and compassion naturally attracted outsiders to 
come and also be transformed by civilization” (Fairbank, 1992, 112). Tributary status was 
generally expected of China’s neighbors regardless of whether the peoples in question were 
actually dependent upon the Tang (Schafer, 1963). Because China’s neighbors were aware that, 
in exchange for their tributary gifts, they would receive ample gifts from the Tang court in 
return, most of them acquiesced to this arrangement “out of sheer self-interest” (Schafer, 1963, 
24). Thus, the tribute system served as the “institutional setting and indeed cover for foreign 
trade” (Fairbank,113). 
 As rebels and internal disasters brought down the Tang dynasty,  they had the same 
effects on trade. Trade routes were disrupted when borders became insecure, from modern-day 
Yunnan province in China’s southwest, to the territory of the Uighur Turks in the northwest, to 
Tibet (where the Gansu trade corridor was taken over), and finally to Canton, where pirates 
helped to facilitate an attack and where foreign merchants were slaughtered by rebels in 879 
(Schafer 1963, Adshead 2000). Trouble also arose on the western end of trading routes; the late 
9
th
  century saw the Persian Gulf port cities of Basra and Ubullah sacked by rebels, while an 
earthquake destroyed the critical port of Siraf in 977 (Adshead 2000). In the absence of a unified 
response, these challenges proved too great for traders and regional governments to overcome. 
By the time the Tang dynasty ended in 908, foreign trade had decreased substantially (Adshead 
2000). 
 
Trade During Song Dynasty 
 After more than fifty years of instability following the fall of the Tang, the Song Dynasty 
began in 960 CE (Fairbank 1992). The return of stability to China’s government benefited trade 
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both domestic and foreign, and China’s trade with other East Asian countries grew both in scale 
and regularity. Like the Tang before it, the Song played an active role in foreign trade, 
establishing monopolies over the production of tea and salt, as well as over spice and incense 
imports (Yoshinobu 1983). Under Emperor Huizong, one-third of government revenue flowed 
from the salt monopoly, and one-twelfth flowed from the liquor monopoly. Unlike the Tang, 
however, the Song dynasty took a more capitalist approach to managing the economy (Adshead 
2000). Rather than tightly controlling all urban markets, “the state was now in partnership with 
the merchants” (Adshead 2000, 117). International trade required silver, but for domestic use, the 
Song mainly promoted copper, as well as paper money (Fairbank 1992, Yoshinobu 1983). 
Overall, however, China ran trade deficits during the late Song, in contrast to its surplus during 
the Tang.  This trade deficit was due to Chinese demand for foreign goods so strong that exports 
simply could not keep up (Fairbank 1992). 
 Historically, China had collected goods from its northern neighbors as part of  the tribute 
system,  which served as  foreign trade (Fairbank, 113). As northern non-Chinese rulers, 
including the Tanguts, the Qidan, and the Jin, gained strength, however, the Song often found 
itself paying rather than collecting tribute (Fairbank 1992). Despite the reversal of power, official 
trade conducted through the tribute system continued. Accompanying the tribute caravans, 
Uighur merchants would come into China to lend money and to arbitrage in gold, which was 
more expensive in the Islamic world than in China (Yoshinobu 1983). Private foreign trade also 
flourished through government-sanctioned markets, driven by increased demand from the urban 
and well-to-do members of all peoples involved. The main commodities that the Song received 
from its northern neighbors, through both official and private trade, included livestock (horses 
and camels), jewels (jade, amber), textiles (cotton cloth, silk brocade), animal products (ivory, 
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yak tail), frankincense and myrrh, weaponry (suits of armor, swords) and bullion (Yoshinobu 
1983, 94). Table 5 provides detail on the Song’s trade relationships with its northern semi-
nomadic neighbors.  
 
Table 5: Song trade relations with semi-nomadic northern neighbors 
 
People Notable 
dynasty 
Location Imports to Song Exports from Song 
Qidan 
(Khitan) 
Liao Easter Inner 
Mongolia / 
Northern 
China 
horses, sheep, fur, 
“woolen cloth, carpets, 
brocade, silver and 
golden ornaments, iron 
suits of armor, slaves, 
and lumber” (97) 
“silk, silk brocade, tea, 
military weapons, marine 
products, ginger, orange 
peel,” dye, “medicines, and 
silver and golden 
ornaments,” Southeast 
Asian goods (97) 
Jurchen 
(Ruzhen, 
Jurched) 
Jin 
(Chin) 
Northern 
Manchuria 
“horses, copper money, 
silver, silk, pearls, 
drugs, marten fur, dyes, 
and salt” (103) 
“tea, silk, valuables from 
Southeast Asia, ginger, 
orange peel, cotton cloth, 
rice and other grains, 
lacquerware, porcelain, 
wooden furniture, gold and 
silver ornaments, writing 
brushes, ink, copper 
money, silver, books, and 
weapons” (103) 
Tanguts Hsi Hsia 
(Xi Xia, 
Western 
Xia) 
South and west 
of the curve in 
the Yellow 
River; oversaw 
critical parts of 
caravan routes 
“horses…, sheep…, 
cattle, camels, dyes, 
licorice, yellow wax, 
musk, medicines, and 
other such western 
goods as borax, jade, 
fine carpets, amber, 
coral, and 
frankincense” (101) 
“tea, silk, silver, exotic 
items from southeast Asia, 
porcelain lacquerware, and 
silver and gold ornaments” 
(101) 
 
Ch’ing-
t’ang 
(Western 
Ch’iang) 
 West of 
Tanguts 
Horses, “mercury, 
musk, and fur” (102) 
Sichuan and Shensi tea 
 
Table constructed from information in Worthy 1983, Rossabi 1983, Fairbank 1992, quotes from 
Yoshinobu 1983 
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Overall, the main goods obtained by the Song through maritime trade included 
“incense…, spices…, cotton, yellow wax, rhinoceros horn, ivory, pearls, silver, gold, tortoise 
shells, and sulfur” while the goods that the Song exported included “silver, gold, silver and gold 
ornaments, copper money, copperware, tinware, lacquerware, ironware, mercury, pottery, 
porcelain, silk, silk cloth, linen, matting, books, and stationery” as well as tea, ginger, and paper 
(Yoshinobu 1983, 108). Table 5 details the type of goods that the Song traded with East Asian 
partners. Considering that re-export of imports was a common practice by countries along the 
maritime routes, Yoshinobu (1983) conjectures that the Red Sea, Eastern Africa, and the Persian 
Gulf were the original sources of the frankincense, myrrh, ambergris, fine carpets, ivory, and 
coral that China obtained by sea. 
How were the goods valued and bartered? Data are scanty, but a few examples of ‘price’ 
conversion ratios, or implicit prices circa the eleventh century, are given in Table 6. Although the 
exchange of certain goods, including salt, weapons, and army provisions, was heavily restricted 
or prohibited in certain situations, illegal trade also flourished (Yoshinobu 1983). Silver flowed 
to correct trade imbalances, and the Song’s northern neighbors often profited as middlemen 
within many trade relationships (Yoshinobu 1983).   
 
Table 6: Examples of price ratios (ca. 11
th
 century) 
 
From Hsi Hsia   Equivalent Song Good 
one sheep several catties of tea 
one horse 20 bolts of silk 
From Ch’ing-t’ang  Equivalent Song Good 
one horse 100 catties of tea 
Table constructed from information in Yoshinobu 1983, 101-102. 
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Finally, driven by Chinese demand for foreign luxuries and facilitated by the Islamic 
diaspora, maritime trade became increasingly vast and important under the late Song Dynasty. 
Adshead (2000) writes that, around this time, “the quantity of maritime shipping outside the 
[Chinese] empire… was in fact of greater importance… than before or afterwards in Chinese 
history” (129). Recognizing its profitability, the Song government chose not to restrict sea trade, 
preferring to exploit it through various port offices instead (Yoshinobu 1983). During the late 
Song, Chinese sea trade increased to the point that foreign trade constituted a significant portion 
of government revenue “for almost the only time before the nineteenth century” (Fairbank 1992, 
92). In fact, the early Song derived 2-3% of its total revenue from sea trade alone (Yoshinobu 
1983, 106). By the time the Song capital was moved to Hangzhou, Chinese shipping technology 
had improved substantially, incorporating techniques learned from Arabs as well as their own 
insights (Yoshinobu 1983). These ships proved able to travel as far as East Africa (Fairbank 
1992). Song porcelains exported at this time have been discovered as far away as Egypt, 
Istanbul, and the Eastern Mediterranean, testifying to the scope of trade (Yoshinobu 1983). 
Nonetheless, disagreement remains as to whether Chinese or Arab ships actually conducted the 
majority of trade (Fairbank 1992, Yoshinobu 1983). Regardless, many Chinese were attracted by 
the opportunities for wealth and became sea merchants (Yoshinobu 1983). Adshead (2000) 
writes that “private shipbuilding equaled or exceeded that of the state and overseas trade, in 
particular, was private rather than public” (117). Chinese merchants venturing abroad 
contributed to the establishment of Chinese settlements throughout Southeast Asia (Adshead 
2000, Yoshinobu 1983). The goods traded during the Song Dynasty are given in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Goods traded by sea during the Song 
 
Partner Imports to Song Exports from Song 
Japan “gold, silver, copper, sulfur, 
mercury, drugs, lumber, 
pearls, steel swords, fine 
furniture”  
“silk, silk brocade, cotton 
cloth, aloe wood, 
sandalwood, ambergris, 
materials for fine furniture, 
books, dyes, porcelains, and 
copper cash”  
Korea “silver, lacquerware, 
matting, copper ware, 
celadons, pongee, linen, fur, 
musk, dyes, ginseng, and 
medicines”  
“myrrh, incense, spices, 
rhinoceros horn, ivory, rare 
birds and flowers (all from 
Africa and Southeast Asia), 
silk, mercury, and books” 
Southeast Asia aloe wood, incense, spices “silver and gold; silk, silk 
brocade; porcelains; 
lacquerware; parasols; 
ironware; matting; silk fans; 
leather drums; glass and 
pearl ware; cochineal; wine; 
rice; sugar; salt; Indian red”  
Table constructed from information in Yoshinobu 1983, 108 
 
 
As Chinese merchants began to travel extensively throughout Southeast Asia, merchants 
adopted several risk-management techniques. Yoshinobu (1983, 108) writes that “large-scale 
trade was often initially unorganized, hazardous, and seasonal, and the merchants were for the 
most part itinerants,” making risk management essential. Temporary partnerships thus arose, 
including instances of agents who carried out voyages on behalf of capital-providing merchants, 
and sometimes including a third ship-owning party as well.  In Mingzhou, Wenzhou, and 
Taizhou, what Yoshinobu (1983, 108) refers to as “crude forms of commenda and societas 
maris” arose. In both a commenda and a societas maris, capital was pooled for use in trade, 
which was carried out either by merchants on behalf of a wealthy backer (commenda) or by the 
suppliers of the capital themselves (societas maris). In both the commenda and the societas 
maris, profits were distributed proportionately to capital contribution (Yoshinobu 1983). 
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Although the Chinese forms of commenda and societas maris were temporary partnerships, 
Adshead (2000, 117) claims the existence “also of joint stock companies” called “lien-ts’ai ho-
pen” . The scope and longevity of these supposed joint-stock companies is unclear. 
 
 
Yüan Dynasty  and trade 
 
In 1276 CE, Mongol forces led by Khubilai Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, overtook Song 
forces at Hangzhou, and the Yüan Dynasty of the Mongols took control of all of China (Hucker 
1975). During its height in the latter half of the 13
th
 century, the Mongol empire extended across 
much of Eurasia, bounded by Egypt, Poland, Java, and Japan (Weatherford 2004). Divided into 
four khanates, of which Khubilai Khan ruled one, the Mongol empire “brought China several 
decades of domestic peace and caravan trade across Asia” (Fairbank 1992, 124). One factor in 
the increase of trade was Yüan domestic policy, including the expansion of the use of paper 
money, lower taxes, stronger property rights, and improved transportation infrastructure 
(Weatherford 2004). Aided by these policies, “Chinese society reached a peak of consumerism 
which it never surpassed and perhaps never equaled” (Adshead 2000, 152). Improved 
cartography and a cosmopolitan openness to foreigners also contributed to trade (Weatherford 
2004). Khubilai Khan’s capital at modern-day Beijing welcomed traders “from as far away as 
Italy, India, and North Africa,” as well as people of many diverse religions (Weatherford 2004, 
198). It was into this China that Marco Polo arrived in 1275 (Masefield 1908). “Probably more 
non-Chinese came into China under the Yüan dynasty than in any other period of Chinese 
history till the nineteenth century,” writes Adshead (2000, 145). At the same time, the Mongols 
sent ambassadors into the wider world as well: in the late 1280s, a Christian envoy from 
Khubilai Khan’s court travelled all the way to England, where he served communion to King 
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Edward I (Weatherford 2004). From domestic consumerism to an earnest interest in the outside 
world, many factors drove the increase in trade under the Yüan.  
Beyond these specific factors, the Mongols in general explicitly made the promotion of 
trade across their vast empire a priority. As mentioned earlier, according to Weatherford (2004), 
the Yüan kept up shelters every twenty to thirty miles along trade routes, providing provisions, 
animals, and guides for travelers. They also created “an early type of combined passport and 
credit card,” which “allowed the holder to travel throughout the empire and be assured of 
protection, accommodations, transportation, and exemption from local taxes or duties” 
(Weatherford 2004, 221). Furthermore, the Yüan raised the social status of merchants to rank 
below only members of government, in direct contradiction of Confucian anti-merchant 
prejudices (Weatherford 2004).  
 Known today as the pax Mongolica, the stable and trade-friendly society presided over by 
Yüan rule contributed to an increase in contact between Asia and the West on all surviving trade 
routes. It was during this time that the central land route truly emerged as an important and “real 
international trade route” (Adshead 2000, 135). The northern land route, for its part, saw growth 
in trade following the establishment of Black Sea ports such as Soldaia, Tana, and Caffa. 
Considering its trade in “silk, spices, and pearls,” Adshead (2000) writes that “probably in its 
heyday [the northern land route] carried a volume of traffic second only to the southern sea 
route” (140-141). Furthermore, “for the first time… trade not culture was the major component 
of the contact” along all routes (Adshead 2000, 142). Not merely idealistic proponents of 
cosmopolitanism, the Yüan realized what they had to gain financially from foreign trade. 
According to Adshead (2000), the salt monopoly provided 50% of the government’s total 
revenue in the years following Khubilai Khan’s reign, and as much as 80% by the 1320s. 
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 Maritime trade, for its part, continued to grow as it had done during the later Song. By 
this time, the southern sea route had absorbed the traffic of the far southern sea route, which 
vanished from significance. Transporting, as always, more goods than either of the land routes, 
the southern sea route’s growth was attributable to increased demand for minerals, textiles, and 
spices, particularly for pepper, on both its Asian and European ends (Adshead 2000). Chinese 
shipbuilding and navigational technology continued to advance, encouraged by Khubilai Khan 
(Weatherford 2004). It is likely that Chinese hands took increasingly more control of the actual 
shipping activity along the southern sea route (Adshead 2000). Khubilai’s ambitions of conquest 
in Southeast Asia also propelled Chinese trade with these regions (Brook 2010). Adshead (2000) 
writes that the southern sea route trade was stable compared to the “hot-house caravan trade of 
the central land route,” and that under the Yüan it attained dynamics that would continue until 
the 1700s (139). 
 Despite the increased flow of trade, and exporting more technologically advanced goods, 
China ran trade deficits with Europe. It imported base iron, copper and tin from Europe and 
exported silk, porcelain, and nautical technology (including the sternpost rudder, magnetic 
compass, gunpowder, and improved clocks) (Adshead 2000). China exported precious metals to 
Europe in order to finance its trade deficit (Adshead 2000). Thus Adshead (2000) writes that “for 
China, outside commodities were a source of impoverishment,” and he identifies “the beginnings 
of a negative attitude toward foreign trade” (153). These dynamics would play out dramatically 
in the centuries to come.  
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The Ming Dynasty and trade 
 
The Ming dynasty was founded in 1368, when Chinese rebels finally ousted the Mongols 
(Hucker 1975). According to Adshead (2000), the early Ming state was “anti-capitalist,” 
receiving much of what it needed “by command rather than the market” (177). More important to 
the early Ming than commerce were diplomacy and international influence. Emerging from 
nearly a century of Mongol Rule, the Ming looked to reassert Chinese cultural prominence 
throughout East Asia as a way to consolidate power. In an attempt to revive the tribute system, 
the Ming commissioned the naval admiral Zheng He on seven missions that reached as far as 
Java and Persia between the years 1405-1431 (Mostern 2013). These missions did not intend to 
“occupy territory, profit from maritime commerce, or explore new lands” but rather to 
“legitimate the Ming in the maritime world by gathering acknowledgments of its supremacy” 
(Mostern 2013, 114). Adshead (2000) notes an ulterior motive in these missions, claiming that 
“the early Ming state disliked private enterprise” and that the revival of the tribute system also 
aimed to “end the anomaly of foreign countries having relations with China through [overseas, 
private] Chinese merchants” (198). In both regards the voyages succeeded, temporarily 
increasing the number of countries sending tribute to China and stifling the activities of overseas 
Chinese merchants along the southern sea route (Adshead 2000). 
Beginning in the 1420s, however, the Ming began to pull resources away from southern 
sea diplomacy. The Mongol threat to the north had reignited, diverting the Ming’s attentions, and 
piracy plaguing the southern coast had significantly increased the riskiness of sea travel (Mostern 
2013). When the Ming pulled resources away from maintaining the overseas tribute system, 
tribute sent to China diminished (Adshead 2000). Around the same time, the Ming withdrew 
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troops from Central Asia and built up the Great Wall (Hucker 1975). Hucker (1975) attributes to 
the early Ming a “xenophobic isolationism” (138). “Though China by no means cowered within 
its frontiers,” He writes, “its attitude toward outsiders became decidedly defensive” (139). While 
retrenching and fortifying itself, the Ming also prohibited private sea trade as an additional 
protection against the outside world. This severely impacted the economies of the provinces on 
the southern coast (Mostern 2013).  
The government’s preferences could not sway the profit-orientation of individuals, 
however, and “by the end of the dynasty the government was forced to take the merchants back 
into more equal partnership” (Adshead 2000, 178). As time went on, “the later court tolerated 
more trade and migration than official polices would have dictated,” and in fact, “private trade 
flourished, Chinese merchant ships sailed the seas, and overseas Chinese merchants worked with 
rulers and traders throughout the maritime world” (Mostern 2013, 115). The reality of exchange 
belying prohibitive official policies had important implications as Europeans arrived on the 
scene. 
While the avenues through which the outside world encountered China were changing, 
the substance of the interaction was also evolving. For example, the types of goods exchanged 
between East and West went through a transition. Adshead (2000) explains that “Europe’s 
imports and exports shifted from the simple to the complex; China’s from the complex to the 
simple” (210). The spice trade peaked and then somewhat declined, as China’s pepper imports 
fell and European demand, while growing to fill the void, proved incapable of supporting overall 
market growth. Incense, including musk, ambergris, and camphor, similarly enjoyed increased 
demand from Europe but to a degree that was insufficient to support previous trade levels 
(Adshead 2000). Certain Chinese medicines also found favor in Europe, as did tea for the first 
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time. Regarding technology, China, as it had during the late Song and the Yüan, found itself 
giving more than it received. According to Adshead (2000), while China introduced technology 
as notable as the printing press, European technology exports to China “were only decoration, 
not acceleration, of major currents in Chinese history” (224). The Ming found itself confirmed in 
the belief that Europe had little to offer China beyond silver. This dynamic is summarized in 
Table 8. Some of the species found in the New World (called American Silver) by the Spanish 
Empire were traded into the Ottoman, Persian and Chinese territories. As the flow of silver from 
America finally contracted in the seventeenth century and the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch 
trading systems all entered hard times, China’s contact with the world at large went into a 
decline (Adshead, 2000).  
 
Table 8:  Goods, technology, and ideas exchanged between China and Europe under the 
Ming 
Exported to Europe Exported to China 
Silk 
Porcelain 
Zinc, cupro-nickel (as silver substitutes) 
China root, rhubarb (medicines) 
Tea 
American silver 
Printing 
Written examination system 
Alcohol distillation 
Crankshaft 
Some hydraulic devices 
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 216-229 
 
 
 
 Chinese rulers and traders from the Tang through the Ming displayed a variety of 
attitudes toward Silk Road trade risk over the years. Where the Tang happily engaged in trade 
while allowing Arab ships and other non-Chinese traders to handle the risk of transporting cargo, 
the Song took a more active role in trade, establishing monopolies over certain goods and 
allowing private markets, shipbuilding, and Chinese-led sea trade to flourish. It was under the 
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Song that Chinese partnerships and joint-stock companies developed as risk-management 
approaches to maritime trade. The Yüan went even farther than the Song in its promotion of 
trade, becoming the first dynasty to take responsibility for risk mitigation all along the land 
routes while simultaneously promoting Chinese-led trade along the sea routes. The Ming, on the 
other hand, decided that the risks of foreign trade outweighed the benefits and prohibited private 
sea trade, although its actions did not always reflect its official policies. Regardless of historical 
context, risk remained a primary consideration in Silk Road trade, and different regimes’ 
approaches had important consequences. 
 
The Europeans 
 
While Europeans, namely the Portuguese, Spanish, English (eventually British) and 
Dutch, did not establish a significant Silk Road presence until the 1500s, their arrival on the 
scene proved to be a game-changer, especially for land trade routes in Central Asia and Middle 
East. While all four countries had an important effect on trade, it was the British and the Dutch 
whose approaches to risk management proved hardiest and most influential on modern 
international business.  In the long run, they changed the industrial organization of  east-west 
trade  taking place in these routes.  
In 1511, the Portuguese took over Malacca on the coast of present-day Malaysia (Hucker 
1975). Central Ming authorities were not pleased by their presence, but the Portuguese proved 
helpful in struggles against pirates, and in return local government authorities granted the 
Portuguese permission to permanently occupy Macao beginning in 1557 (Adshead 2000). Since 
trade was only allowed within the tribute system, the Portuguese appealed to the Ming court for 
tributary status but were rejected (Brook 2010). Locked out of the tribute system but determined 
to trade, the Portuguese found their way into an existing intra-regional secondary market for 
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Chinese goods that revolved around tributary states (Brook, 2010). Brook (2010) describes this 
secondary market as “a ‘world-economy’… a relatively autonomous but internally integrated 
trading zone” extant since the latter 1400s (226-227). When the Spanish settled at Manila in 
1570 and the Dutch at Java in 1609, they joined the Portuguese as newcomers to this thriving 
network (Brook 2010). The details of their particular positions within this network are described 
in Table 9 below. Adshead (2000) believes the Spanish Manila system to be the overall superior 
route. Driven by a silver supply so plentiful that the Mexican dollar eventually became an 
accepted form of Chinese currency, “Manila throve for two centuries, where Macao dwindled as 
an isolated city state, and the [Dutch East India Company], for all its modernity, stumbled into 
bankruptcy…” (208). In the course of their activities, the Europeans established new trading 
routes, the Cape Route and the Pacific Route (Table 9). 
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Table  9: European trading systems during the Ming 
 
Country Name Base Characteristics 
Portuguese Macao system Macao  -“direct, territorial contact 
through the medium of bullion” 
(203) 
 -sometimes “troubled by 
Chinese officialdom” (208) 
-managed by Portuguese 
government institutions 
-served European market 
Spanish Manila system Manila -“traded offshore served by 
Chinese private enterprise” (208) 
-functioned on a “simple, barter-
like trading mechanism” (208) 
-was “essentially a colony of 
Mexico” with “abundant and 
reliable” silver supply (207) 
-served European and American 
markets 
-“carried the most significant 
volume of goods in both 
directions” of ANY Chinese 
trade route, land or sea, at this 
time (208) 
Dutch Batavia system Batavia  
(modern-day 
Jakarta) 
-“indirect offshore contact 
through the medium of goods” 
(204) 
-“more rational than the Macao 
system” (206) 
-managed by the Dutch East 
India Company, a “herald of 
private enterprise” (206) 
-served European market 
Table constructed from information in Adshead, 2000 
 
 The fates of various trading routes, both new and old, during the time of the European 
entry are summarized in Table 10.  
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Table 10: The fate of various trade routes under the Ming 
 
Route Fate Cause of Change 
Central land route Peaked and then declined Peak: Tamerlane’s attacks 
on northern land route and 
southern sea route forced 
additional traffic into 
central land route 
 
Decline: Wars in the 
sixteenth century, including 
the Safavid reformation 
Northern land route Rendered “blocked and 
lifeless” (203) 
Ravaged by Tamerlane 
Southern sea route Declined, “reduced to 
second-class traffic in the 
hands of humbler 
merchants” (200) 
Lost traffic to new Cape 
route after Portuguese 
captured Malacca in 1511 
Cape route Created by the Portuguese 
and adopted by the Dutch 
Macao system of 
Portuguese 
Batavia system of Dutch 
Pacific route Created by the Spanish and 
became “the most important 
link between China and the 
outside world” during its 
time (206) 
Manila system of the 
Spanish 
Table constructed from information in Adshead 2000, 195-209 
 
 
 While the Portuguese and the Spanish both had important impacts on maritime Silk Road 
trade, it is the Dutch Republic and the British Empire that are most relevant to the risk 
management discussion. In the Dutch Republic, while temporary partnerships had proven 
generally sufficient to finance Dutch trade voyages to West Africa, Italy, and the Caribbean, the 
introduction of ventures to Asia raised capital requirements by as much as two- to four-fold 
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Voyages to Asia also entailed substantially higher risks, and 
investors would need to accept longer timetables for return given the length of the voyages. The 
first response to this challenge was the oversight of voyages to Asia by merchant committees, 
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who then sold subshares to their personal contacts in order to divide risk where “both shares and 
subshares were fully understood to be limited liability, and transferable… which helped to 
safeguard liquidity” ((Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 649). Like modern shares of common stock, 
subshares in these early enterprises provided profit and risk commensurate with investment, but 
unlike modern common stock, subshareholders “had no say in the management” (Gelderblom & 
Jonker 2004, 649).  
 By the time that the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or 
VOC) was formed out of several extant trade companies in 1602, the directors were well aware 
of the cash flow problems facing the sector. During 1600 and 1601, for example, revenues of 
trade ventures had “lagged about 1.5 million guilders behind total investment,” which was of 
clear concern for investors (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 650). To help shareholders raise 
liquidity, the VOC’s directors allowed investors to pay for newly purchased shares in four 
installments over five years, which better matched the timing of investments against that of 
returns (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). When, as a result of this policy, the VOC found itself 
without adequate cash to prepare its ships for sailing, it encouraged shareholders to pay in 
advance of when their installments were due by offering 8% interest on early payments 
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). The VOC further supplemented its cash flow through the 
Amsterdam money market (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Notably, unlike earlier companies, the 
VOC encountered sufficient investor interest that over two-thirds of its capital was raised from 
investors. Gelderblom & Jonker (2004) state that “the Amsterdam chamber had more than 1,100 
initial subscribers on an estimated adult population of no more than 50,000 people” (654). Even 
small-scale investors were eager to participate due to profits of previous Asian trade ventures 
(Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). 
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 However, the real success of VOC shares among investors came from their ease of 
transferability, an innovation at the time. The VOC promoted share transferability as a way of 
justifying the fact that it wanted to tie up investors’ capital for ten years, a strategy it thought 
important in building a lasting presence vis-à-vis English and Portuguese competition. In action, 
the VOC’s straightforward share transfer policy had the effect of creating a thriving secondary 
market (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Before the creation of the VOC, shares of preceding trade 
companies had been exchanged only among “a narrow circle of insiders,” but during the period 
1603-1607, VOC shares traded at a rate of 100-200 shares per year (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 
653). “Selling shares had now become so common,” state Gelderblom & Jonker (2004), “that the 
VOC board attempted to have its ten-year charter extended to 20 years, arguing that investors 
could get their money back from the market immediately and thus would not be disadvantaged 
from an extension” (656).  
 In a further indication of VOC’s share popularity, traders began to use VOC shares both 
for speculation and as collateral on loans. Put into use as early as the month of the VOC’s 
founding, VOC shares were “an ideal loan collateral” because they were “a claim on a company 
known to all; very liquid, so easy to sell in case of default; with daily price quotations for quick 
valuation; and with ownership easily ascertained” (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 660). On the 
speculative side, traders explored futures trading (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). Overall, the 
VOC’s “active traders formed a large and varied crowd indeed” (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 
658).  
 Considering that by 1608, the VOC’s returns exceeded investments by 6.3 million 
guilders, it is clear that the VOC’s approach to risk management achieved its desired outcome in 
the short term (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004). The very fact that its shares “provided the crucial 
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breakthrough” in the genesis of secondary markets demonstrates that its risk was appropriately 
delegated to parties happy to bear it (Gelderblom & Jonker 2004, 666). However, according to 
Neal (2003), England’s East India Company reinterpreted the Dutch model in ways that arguably 
positioned it for better long-term success.  
 The EIC, like the VOC, arose at the start of the 17th century in response to the high 
capital requirements and risk inherent in long-distance trade (Chaudhuri 1999). Where the VOC 
was titanic, however, the EIC was small and striving. The EIC’s starting capital amounted to a 
mere £30,000, compared to the VOC’s £540,000 (Gardner 1972). As of 1610, the VOC had sent 
60 ships to Asia, whereas the EIC had sent only 17 (Gardner 1972). Lawson (2013) goes so far 
as to suggest that the EIC was “a last desperate throw” in England’s attempts to join the Dutch, 
Spanish, and Portuguese in Asian trade (6). Nevertheless, by the time that William and Mary 
took the English throne in 1689, the English began not only to imitate but also to improve upon 
the Dutch approach to risk management. First of all, while the VOC did not increase its capital 
stock over its original level throughout the course of its life, the EIC and other English 
companies continued to issue new securities throughout the next century (Neal 2003). The 
increasing supply of securities enhanced their liquidity and thus sustained their usefulness as 
loan collateral (Neal 2003). By contrast, without a similar increase in supply and liquidity, the 
usefulness of VOC shares as loan collateral eventually dwindled, and by 1720, “even the Dutch 
merchants turned increasingly to using British securities as collateral for their loans” (Neal 2003, 
14). Although the liquidity of VOC shares proved a revolutionary force in Dutch financial 
markets when first introduced, this liquidity was not sustained, to the eventual detriment of 
Dutch competitiveness vis-à-vis the English.  
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 Secondly, in addition to the liquidity gap, the EIC and other English companies surpassed 
the VOC by doing away with various inefficiencies particular to Dutch operations. For example, 
only half of VOC stock could be transferred through the VOC’s main Amsterdam office (Neal 
2003). This was due in part to the fact that the VOC’s capital stock was distributed among its six 
regional chambers (Neal 2003). The EIC, on the other hand, made 100% of its capital stock 
transferable through its London office (Neal 2003). Furthermore, the EIC and other English 
institutions made their securities available for daily transfer, whereas the VOC limited transfers 
to a monthly or quarterly schedule (Neal 2003). Finally, stockholders of the EIC had the power 
to elect directors, and even foreigners were invited to purchase stock, further enhancing liquidity 
(Neal 2003). Overall, the English rationalized the VOC model and constructed it within a more 
centralized organizational framework, enhancing its liquidity and eliminating various 
inefficiencies. Together, these factors strengthened the EIC’s approach to risk management and 
contributed to its ability to outlast the VOC by three quarters of a century. After these 
capitalizations of trade with mitigated risks, East-West trade substantially changed in structure, 
organization and profitability. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
China had better technology than its western trading partners for much of the Silk Road 
history.  This East-West flow of trade created one of the most important trade routes in world 
history.  Throughout the different dynasties, China alternated between having trade surpluses and 
trade deficits, and between free trade policies and mercantilist policies.    
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Capital markets were thin in all countries throughout Silk Road history. Trader risks were 
private risks or were partially backed by governments and resulted in many merchant failures in 
monopolistically competitive markets with small scale firms. 
Deep capital markets were realized by the Dutch and the English who formed institutions 
to share risks among merchants and shareholders and therefore also increased liquidity pools.  
These institutionalized risk sharing  revolutionized trade, brought changes to home markets yet  
turned  some of this  trade  to ‘immiserating growth’ for eastern regions. Trade then had to be 
conducted through colonial and militarily suppressive relationships. The land trade routes though 
Central Asia and MENA slowly dried up, leaving urban decay, unemployment and anarchy in its 
trails which persist to this day in some areas.   
In the meantime, technological change and import substitution in the West as well 
as intensive agriculture in the newly discovered continent shifted the focus of world trade from 
China to Americas (New World).  Liquidity, trade credit focused on the New World, where sugar 
cane, mahogany, cotton, coffee, tobacco, cocoa had high rates of return, yet the production of  
which was made possible with (unfortunate) slave labor. World trade became more oligopolistic 
with terms of trade very favorable to colonial powers.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Country-specific source information for Table 3, provided by Bolt & Van Zanden: 
 
Italy 
1300-1911’,  European Review of Economic History 15 (2): 169-219. Data prior to 1861 refer to 
Centre-North Italy.  
1861-1990 from Baffigi, A. (2011). “Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011”, Banca d’Italia 
Economic History Working Papers 18. 
 
Netherlands  
Data 1348-1807 from Van Zanden, J. L. and B. van Leeuwen (2012). Figures prior to 1807 apply 
to Holland only.  
From 1807-1913 from Smits, J.P., E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000). The Measurement of 
Gross National Product and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre Monograph series no 5). 
 
Portugal 
Reis, J., Martins, C.A., and Costa, L.F. (2011). “New Estimates of Portugal’s GDP per Capita, 
1500-1850,” Prepared for the “Quantifying long run economic development conference”, 
University of Warwick in Venice, 22-24 March 2011. 
 
Spain 
1270 – 1850 from Álvarez-Nogal, C. and L. Prados de la Escosura (2013). "The Rise and Fall of 
Spain (1270- 1850)," Economic History Review, 66, 1, 1-37, using their annual benchmarks. 
 
China 
Maddison’s original estimates. 
 
India 
1600 – 1871 from Broadberry, S. J. Custodis and B. Gupta, (2013) India and the Great 
Divergence: An Anglo- Indian comparison of GDP per capita 1600 – 1871, London School of 
Economics Working paper, table. 14, p. 38. 
 
Indonesia/Java  
1880-2008 from Van der Eng, P. (2010). “The Source of Long-Term Economic Growth in 
Indonesia, 1880-2008”, Explorations in Economic History, 47: 294-309.  
In 1880 the ratio Java/Indonesia was 0.8211. 
 
Japan 
730-1870 (1872) from Bassino, J.P., S. Broadberry, K. Fukao, B. Gupta and M. Takashima 
(2011). “Japan and the Great Divergence, 730-1870”, Working Paper, p. 20, table 6, GDP pc 
International 1990 dollars. 
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South Korea 
1820 - 1940 trend from original Maddison estimates applied to benchmark for 1934/36 from 
Fukao, K., D. Ma and T. Yuan (2007). Real GDP in Pre-War East Asia: A 1934-36 Benchmark 
Purchasing Power Parity Comparison with the U.S. Review of Income and Wealth, 53 (3): 503 - 
537. 
 
Iraq 
700-1500 from Pamuk,  .  and  M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the 
Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th 
Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011. 
 
Turkey/Byzantium/Ottoman Empire 
700-1500 from Pamuk,  .  and  M. Shatzmiller (2011). “Real Wages and GDP per capita in the 
Medieval Islamic Middle East in Comparative Perspective, 700-1500”, paper presented at the 9th 
Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, Dublin, September 2-3, 2011; 
Milanovic, B. (2006), “An estimate of average income and inequality in Byzantium around year 
1000,” Review of Income and Wealth 52 (3). 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 Trade under the Tang was heavily regulated in terms of both goods and trading partners 
(Schafer 1963). The “tribute system” served as the “institutional setting and indeed cover for 
foreign trade” (Fairbank 1992, 113). Under the tribute system, China’s neighbors (particularly 
nomadic tribes) were expected to send gifts to the Chinese emperor as a way of recognizing 
China’s cultural superiority (Fairbank 1992). Because China’s neighbors were aware that, in 
exchange for their tributary gifts, they would receive ample gifts from the Tang court in return, 
most of them acquiesced to this arrangement “out of sheer self-interest” (Schafer 1963, 24). 
 
 
1 
Indonesia includes Timor until 1999 
2 
Indonesia is Java before 1880 
3 
2008 growth calculated using 2007 as previous period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
